

## Coordination with asymmetries in highly complex and volatile environments

Jordi Brandts  
Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) and Barcelona GSE  
Jordi.Brandts@uab.es

Jessica Ellis  
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona  
jessicalee.ellis@uab.cat

Carles Sola Belda  
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona  
carles.sola.belda@uab.cat

**Abstract:** We propose an analysis of collective trust in environments characterized by high volatility and strategic complexity. Though trust has been examined from different points of view, we highlight the collective nature of trust in certain situations and characterize it by using coordination games, specifically the weakest-link game. In this setting, the standard prediction of multiplicity of equilibria typically results in poor, efficient coordination outcomes. Hence, our research will show how, in this difficult environment, collective trust may emerge through the role of heuristics in the presence of volatility and complexity. We will induce these two characteristics by adding obstacles to coordination: our variables will imply that subjects face heterogeneities in decision time, risk, strategic complexity, and cognitive load. As an experimental project, our results will show effective levels of coordination in these situations and strategies organizations may implement to overcome suboptimal coordination levels. The strategies that we select to improve coordination are identity building, communication and leadership. The experimental methodology allows us to control these variables and explore possible interactions among them.